The mothballing of INEOS’s acetyl plants in Hull exposes an uncomfortable flaw in European climate policy: reducing emissions at home is not necessarily the same thing as reducing emissions.
There is a peculiar way in which a country can become greener without the world becoming greener at all. Close a factory. Its gas consumption disappears from the national energy balance. Its carbon dioxide emissions disappear from the national inventory. Politicians can point to declining industrial emissions and, statistically at least, progress has been made.
The products that factory used to manufacture, however, do not necessarily disappear. They are simply made somewhere else. That is roughly what is now happening in Hull, on the east coast of England.
INEOS announced on 22 September that it is mothballing all three of its world-scale acetyl plants there. According to the company, these are the last remaining world-scale acetyl production units in Europe. The plants manufacture chemical building blocks used in pharmaceuticals, clothing, cosmetics, detergents, construction materials, food products and even military explosives. INEOS says almost 4,000 jobs are supported by the plants and their wider supply chain. (INEOS)
At first sight, this looks like another story about an old European chemical complex succumbing to global competition. But Hull is more interesting than that. Because this was not a dirty, ageing plant whose owner refused to modernise. INEOS had actually done almost exactly what European and British climate policy asks energy-intensive industry to do. It decarbonised.
A £30 million experiment
INEOS invested £30 million in Hull to replace natural gas with low-carbon hydrogen as a fuel. The hydrogen is available as a co-product from existing manufacturing processes at the site, making this a particularly practical example of industrial symbiosis rather than a speculative hydrogen project.
According to INEOS, the conversion reduced the site’s CO₂ emissions by 75%, or roughly 220,000 tonnes per year. (INEOS) That should make Hull something close to a textbook example of industrial decarbonisation.
Take an existing European chemical plant. Preserve its infrastructure, workers, customers and engineering knowledge. Replace a carbon-intensive energy source with a lower-carbon alternative. Reduce emissions dramatically without eliminating production.
Yet little more than a year after publicising that achievement, the plants are being mothballed. That deserves more attention than the closure of yet another factory. It raises the question of whether European climate policy is sufficiently good at distinguishing between decarbonising industry and eliminating industry. The two are not the same.
The strange economics of carbon
Hull had already provided an unusually revealing example of how regulation can interact with successful decarbonisation.
After the hydrogen investment reduced emissions by 75%, the UK Environment Agency initially sought to reclassify the site under the UK Emissions Trading Scheme. INEOS said this would have resulted in approximately £23 million of carbon allowances being withheld. The decision was subsequently reversed. INEOS’s own annual report states that the Environment Agency confirmed in June 2025 that it would no longer reclassify the site. (INEOS) So the £23 million was not ultimately taken away.
But the episode illustrates a broader problem. Carbon-pricing systems are designed around installations, benchmarks and allowances. Industrial decarbonisation, meanwhile, is an engineering process. Change the process sufficiently and a plant may move into a different regulatory category.
Rules designed to encourage lower emissions can therefore produce strange incentives when a company actually makes a large technological leap. That was not what finally killed the economics of Hull. The much larger problem is energy.
Twelve times the price
Chemical plants do not merely consume energy. In many processes, energy and hydrocarbons are part of the chemistry itself. That makes the chemical industry extraordinarily sensitive to gas and electricity prices.
INEOS says European natural gas currently costs around twelve times as much as gas in the United States. It also says European gas is roughly eight times more expensive than coal-based energy used by competing Chinese production. (INEOS)
Those figures are company claims and should be treated as such. But the underlying competitiveness problem is hardly controversial. Energy-intensive European industries have struggled for years with structurally higher energy costs than many international competitors. Carbon pricing then adds another layer.
In principle, that is precisely what carbon pricing is supposed to do. If emitting CO₂ imposes a societal cost, that cost should become visible in economic decisions. Producers then have an incentive to improve efficiency, electrify, switch fuels or redesign processes. Hull did that. The problem begins when its competitors operate under fundamentally different conditions.
A carbon price works elegantly inside an economic model with comparable carbon constraints. It becomes much more complicated in a global market in which a low-carbon British molecule competes directly with a high-carbon molecule made elsewhere.
The carbon leakage problem
INEOS claims that acetyl products manufactured in the United States have approximately twice the carbon footprint of its Hull production, while equivalent Chinese products can have eight times the footprint. (INEOS)
Again, these are INEOS figures rather than an independent comparative life-cycle assessment. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that the direction is correct even if the precise ratios are debated. Then something remarkable can happen. Closing Hull reduces British emissions. Replacing its output with imports can increase global emissions. This phenomenon has a name: carbon leakage.
It is not an invention of industry lobbyists. The British government explicitly recognises it. Government policy documents define carbon leakage as the movement of production and associated emissions from one country to another because jurisdictions impose different levels of decarbonisation effort or carbon pricing. (GOV.UK)
The UK is therefore introducing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM, from January 2027. Importers of selected carbon-intensive goods will effectively face a carbon price intended to make the treatment of domestic and foreign production more comparable. (GOV.UK)
There is, however, an awkward detail. The initial British CBAM covers aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, iron and steel. Acetyl chemicals are not on the list. So the mechanism designed to prevent precisely this kind of carbon leakage does not currently solve the problem demonstrated by Hull.
Territorial emissions are not global emissions
Behind this industrial story lies a more fundamental accounting problem. Governments are primarily judged on emissions produced within their territories. That makes sense administratively: Britain can regulate a factory in Hull but not a coal-fired chemical complex in China.
Yet the atmosphere has no customs office. A tonne of CO₂ emitted in China has essentially the same climatic effect as a tonne emitted in Yorkshire. This creates a potentially dangerous gap between national climate performance and global climate performance.
Imagine a country that closes its steelworks, chemical plants, fertiliser factories and refineries and imports the same products instead. Its territorial emissions could fall spectacularly. Its consumption might barely change. And global emissions might even rise.
Such a country has not necessarily decarbonised its economy. It may partly have outsourced the carbon-intensive part of that economy. That distinction becomes increasingly important as Europe approaches the harder stages of decarbonisation.
Closing inefficient industrial processes can certainly be environmentally beneficial. But replacing relatively efficient domestic production with more carbon-intensive imports is a very different proposition. Climate policy should be able to distinguish between the two.
There is more at stake than CO₂
Factories are also repositories of knowledge. The Hull site contains INEOS Acetyls’ global technology team. When industrial capacity disappears, therefore, Europe does not merely lose tonnes of annual production. It risks losing process engineers, operators, maintenance expertise, apprenticeships, supplier networks and the accumulated practical knowledge required to operate and improve complex chemical processes.
Those capabilities are surprisingly difficult to recreate. A chemical plant can be represented on a balance sheet as steel, vessels, pipes and land. In reality, much of its value exists in people and experience. This matters strategically.
Europe wants cleaner industry, but it simultaneously wants resilient supply chains for pharmaceuticals, energy systems, defence, food and advanced materials. All of these ultimately depend on physical industrial processes.
An economy cannot consist entirely of research institutes, software companies and consultants while assuming that someone elsewhere will continue making all the molecules. The energy transition itself requires enormous quantities of steel, cement, chemicals, copper, aluminium, polymers and specialist materials. A green economy remains an industrial economy.
The wrong metric
The lesson from Hull is therefore not that carbon pricing is inherently wrong, nor that climate policy should be abandoned. Quite the opposite. If the objective is genuinely to reduce global greenhouse-gas emissions, climate policy has to become more sophisticated. The relevant question should not merely be:
How much CO₂ is emitted inside our borders?
It should increasingly become:
How can we produce the materials we need with the lowest realistic global emissions?
That changes the policy discussion.
Cheap and abundant low-carbon energy becomes climate policy. Industrial electrification becomes climate policy. Hydrogen infrastructure becomes climate policy. Carbon border mechanisms become climate policy. Trade policy becomes climate policy. And retaining highly efficient European production can, under some circumstances, become climate policy too.
This does not mean protecting every factory indefinitely. Some industrial processes genuinely become obsolete. Some plants are inefficient and should close. Subsidising uncompetitive production without conditions merely postpones restructuring.
But Hull represents a much harder case. Here was a plant whose owner invested £30 million, substituted hydrogen for natural gas and reports having reduced CO₂ emissions by 75%. The result was not an obvious competitive advantage. The plants are now being mothballed.
The operation was successful
Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the chairman of INEOS, has described current European industrial policy as “economic vandalism on an industrial scale.” (INEOS)
That language is deliberately provocative, and INEOS clearly has a commercial interest in how this debate is framed. But policymakers should not dismiss the underlying question because they dislike the messenger.
Europe and Britain are conducting one of the largest industrial transformations since the introduction of the steam engine. Carbon-intensive production must become low-carbon production within only a few decades. That transformation will require enormous investment by precisely the companies operating today’s industrial infrastructure.
Those companies need a credible answer to a simple question: What happens after we decarbonise? If the answer is that they must still buy much more expensive energy, carry domestic carbon costs and compete without adjustment against higher-carbon production from jurisdictions with lower environmental costs, the investment case becomes difficult.
And if the cleanest European factories close first, something has gone badly wrong. The emissions have not disappeared. The factory has.
Sources & further reading
Use the references in the article above, or add a dedicated sources block at the end of the post.
